EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE AMERICAS: A
REVIEW
Joseph P. Farrell*
SUMMARY
This paper provides a critical analysis of the role played by
international cooperation, particularly multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, in
support of large-scale educational reform programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. It
is argued that most major educational reform programs have failed or had limited success.
A review of what has been learned about designing and implementing educational reform
provides a framework for examining the record regarding the contribution of international
cooperation. It is argued that contribution has for the most part been negative. A list is
provided of common counterproductive behaviors among donor agencies. An alternate model of
international cooperation, labeled "horizontal intellectual cooperation," is
described. It is finally argued that while large-scale national reform is difficult
school-level change is relatively easy. A useful role for international cooperation would
be to assist in learning from many small-scale successful changes and to stimulate local
capacity to innovate.
Introduction
The letter from Jeff Puryear and Jose Joaquin Brunner that
sets out the specifications for this review paper states the following:
"Specifically, we would like you to prepare a comprehensive background memorandum
that reviews experience with educational cooperation and assistance between North and
South America, with the goal of identifying current deficiencies and suggesting new
modalities. Your memorandum should look carefully at existing forms of educational
cooperation and aid at the bilateral and regional level, take note of strengths and
weaknesses, and suggest improvements." In addition, I am referred to the Dialogue's
report, Convergence and Community; The Americas in 1993, the proposal for this
educational task force, and, as a "benchmark for our initiative," the
Unesco-CEPAL document, Education and Knowledge: Basic Pillars of Changing Production
Patterns with Social Equity. Reference to these documents is useful since they provide
the context--the view of the future--through which any observations and recommendations I
might make will be seen. However, in reviewing the "predictions" about the
future contained explicitly or implicitly in these background documents, and comparing
them to my own sense of where things are going, I am reminded of an old (possibly
apocryphal) Chinese proverb: "Prediction is always difficult; especially with respect
to the future." There are some of those predictions with which I agree (which means
mainly that I share at least some of the biases of those who have made them), and some
with which I disagree (which means that I don't share all of those biases). The matter is
important to note at the outset because some of the differences lead to differing
conclusions about appropriate educational policy and, consequently, to different notions
about directions and modalities for educational cooperation.
I will at this introductory point provide only a few key
examples of such differences of view of the future with attendant educational
implications. On p. 1 of the master proposal it is claimed that one of the problems with
Latin American educational systems is that they have "proved unresponsive to rapidly
changing labor markets." Further down the same page the document states: "Open
economies integrated into the global system require an internationally competitive labor
force with an emphasis on science and technology." In all three documents the
educational implications drawn from those claims are then drawn out primarily, if not
exclusively, with reference to the formal school systems of the region.
There are several problems with this chain of analysis.
First, if labor markets are indeed "rapidly changing," as they appear to be,
then formal school systems which take from one to two decades to convert a first grade
student into a labor market entrant, will by definition be unresponsive to such rapid
changes. Less formal occupational training systems, operated by enterprises and nonformal
education agencies, are required. Second, those labor market changes which are occurring
do not provide a strong case for a "science and technology" emphasis for most
students.
Evidence from the United States, based on projections by the
American Bureau of Labor Statistics, indicates that while the greatest proportional
growth will be in occupations demanding high levels of education and specialized training,
particularly in science and technology, the greatest number of new jobs will be
created in occupational categories which require minimal formal education. And the
evidence regarding the "deskilling" of many such job categories suggests that
many of those new jobs will require even less formal education in the future than they do
now (Bailey 1991). Canadian occupational projections show much the same story. Well over
half of all new jobs estimated to be created by the mid-1990s will be low level,
increasingly deskilled, educationally undemanding positions. The five largest categories
of new jobs are predicted to be (in order) sales clerks, bank cashiers and tellers,
secretaries, clerks, and truck drivers (COPS 1990). Can one realistically expect the
pattern to be different in Latin America? Indeed, the major concern among many North
American workers is that the low tech, increasingly deskilled heavy manufacturing jobs
will be those which are "exported south." Moreover, what is one really talking
about when referring to a "modern workplace" for most Latin American workers?
Can one really imagine that the millions of Latin American peasants, or their children,
will find themselves in the foreseeable future in a "modern workplace" which is
heavily science/technology dependent? Or the children of the millions of urban slum
dwellers? Or the parentless street kids? Surely there is a need for more--and more
sophisticated--science and technology knowledge among that relatively small minority of
young people in both North and South America who are likely to end up in high-level
managerial and research/development/entrepreneurial positions. And clearly it would be
desirable for all people in all of the Americas to have a better basic
understanding of "science." But while these are worthy goals, little is known
about how to provide such general science understanding to the population not pursuing
careers in scientific fields, and we in North America have very little to teach the rest
of the hemisphere about how to do this. There have been many experiments but little solid
evidence of widespread impact. What both of the observations above indicate is that
responses to the changing nature of the world economy, and the position of all of the
American nations in it, are likely to require much more emphasis on out-of-school-based
knowledge creation and transmittal systems. Generally speaking, these are more likely to
be designed and run effectively by nongovernmental than by governmental delivery systems.
If this is the case, then forms of international cooperation which assume or depend upon
government-to-government or international agency-to-government relationships are likely to
be quite ineffective, and quite new forms of cooperation arrangements will have to
be invented.
There is a further general problem with these background
documents. There is an air of certainty about them, with respect to the future, and with
respect to the current and desired future state of education over the entire hemisphere,
which is somewhere between chutzpa and hubris. Surely if any of us once thought that we
could make reasonably certain claims about how the future would unfold, particularly at
the level of national and international economics and politics, the experience of the past
few years should have disabused us of that notion. The confident claims about the future
in these documents strike this reader as more nearly a neo-liberal wish list than anything
else. Certainly there has been movement toward a more openly competitive and integrated
international economy over the past few years, but the forces of national (or regional)
protectionism are still strong, and which way things will actually go is still an open
question. As of this writing (November 1993) it is not clear whether the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will actually be approved by all three of the nations
involved. The U.S. has just approved it, but with many concessions to strong protectionist
forces, and Canada has still not agreed. The eventual fate of the Uruguay round of the
GATT remains uncertain. The farm subsidy war between the United States and the European
community, which is savaging the agricultural industry in Canada and much of the
developing world, rages on. For every economist who confidently claims that we are
beginning to emerge from the near-worldwide recession one can find another who will
equally confidently claim that recovery will be a very long time coming, or indeed that
things will get much worse before they begin to get better. Now, I have my own personal
preferences on these matters, but I learned a long time ago not to assume that the world
will necessarily work out as I would like it to. And I would not want to recommend that
any nation of the Americas stake its educational policy on the assumption that one
particular vision of the economic future will come to pass. Rather, one should be thinking
of policies, and forms of cooperation, which will be useful across a wide range of
possible futures. It turns out that many of the policy suggestions found in these
documents do fit that prescription, but not all do.
There is a broader and deeper trend related to the above
which may have a very profound impact on the ways we even think about educational policy
and international cooperation. These background documents stress the
"techno-economic" impacts of recent and ongoing technological change. What is
not noted clearly is the political impact, the effect upon the very definition of
the nation-state. Educational policy is a means by which states control and regulate the
provision of opportunities to learn in organized ways among (at least) the young, and
increasingly among adults. That is, it is an instrument of statecraft. There are
several different models or theories of "the state," but all assume the modern
concept of the nation-state which arose in Europe two to three centuries ago and which has
become well-nigh universal.
Educational policy is a national activity, except in
some federal states such as Canada where it is partly or wholly the responsibility of
lower levels of government which for purposes of education behave like nation-states. But
in the early 1990s many of the assumed basic characteristics of the nation-state appear to
be changing. In an era where technology permits the essentially instantaneous transfer of
huge amounts of capital from almost anywhere and any currency to anywhere, no nation has
sovereign and autonomous control over its fiscal and monetary policy--as Sweden and the
United Kingdom learned very recently. Cultural systems and symbols are rapidly becoming as
easily transferred internationally as is capital. The technical wizards claim that we are
a very short time away from the point where almost anyone anywhere in the world with the
price of a cheap VCR can buy a small dish antenna which will give them access directly in
their home to television signals from almost everywhere in the world, with no form of
state regulation or control effectively possible. What does national cultural sovereignty
mean in such circumstances? Those who have thought about such patterns at all in the past
have tended to think in terms of some form of "dependency" theory. It appears
that we are moving rapidly toward a situation where all nations are to a rather
high degree dependent nations; where all states have less and less effective
control over their economies, their societies or their polities. When these patterns are
combined with a widespread growth of sub-national loyalties they are in many cases leading
to the literal disintegration (in the precise meaning of that word: dis-integration) of
nation states.
In a recent book Fuller (1991) uses the term "fragile
state" to refer to conditions in many developing nations. It appears that currently all
nations, rich or poor, are becoming increasingly fragile states. A further complication in
many parts of Latin America, and in Canada, is that among many sub-national groups
(indigenous peoples, for example, or a significant portion of Quebec society) there has
never been a full acceptance of the power or legitimacy of the nation-state in which they
live. Migdal, in his aptly titled book Strong Societies and Weak States (1987),
observes that in such cases one frequently has a condition in which the various societies
within a polity are stronger than the fragile nation-state which putatively encompasses
them. All of this most profoundly challenges previous understandings of what educational
policy is, and what it is about, but the implications are not yet at all
clear. What does it really mean to plan education as an instrument of national
economic, social, or cultural policy in such circumstances? What does it mean to talk of
international cooperation when the various national entities involved are becoming
increasingly fragile?
One possible implication for the main theme of this paper is
the following. International agencies (e.g., the development banks and national aid
agencies such as CIDA and USAID) work ordinarily or exclusively at the level of the
fragile state. It is usually nongovernmental organizations which work with what Migdal
calls the "strong societies" within the fragile states. This may have, and may
increasingly have, the perverse effect of channelling the largest flows of international
cooperation resources at the level where they can have the least effect, or may indeed
have counterproductive effects. I will cite here just one example of how this perverse
effect can work, which I know from personal experience. In a Latin American nation (which
I will not name) a textbook development and distribution program partially funded by an
international agency ran into difficulties in delivering the books in many rural villages
because an ongoing "insurgency" (read civil war pitting indigenous peoples and
very poor mestizo villagers against the "national" government) had effectively
destroyed most of the transportation infrastructure and made life quite dangerous for any
"agents" of the national government, however well-intentioned. I was told
proudly by government officials and officials of the international agency that the problem
had been solved by using the national armed forces, whose jeeps, trucks, and helicopters
could reach even the most remote portions of the national territory, to deliver the
textbooks. It never occurred to them that what this meant was that the textbooks, which
"naturally" carried "national" messages and symbols, were being
delivered by those who were, in the villagers' experience, the "nation's" main
agents among them of death and destruction. I was told later by several literacy/community
development workers with an NGO active in the villages that the symbolism had not been
lost on the local people. The textbooks were rejected in the villages and their arrival
led even more families to withdraw their children from the village schools. This is of
course an extreme example, but as with extreme examples generally it serves to starkly
outline the difficulties possible when working internationally with fragile states rather
than strong societies.
One possible response to this general condition (or at least
what might be seen as such a response) is the move toward "decentralization,"
often encouraged and supported through international cooperation. This approach is cited
and lauded in the master proposal for this dialogue. I personally support it (but not in
all cases; it is an often useful tool but not a universal nostrum). However,
decentralization as usually conceived misconstrues the problem. Decentralization normally
refers to the devolution by the central state authority of various forms of power and
control to lower, more localized levels of government. But if the central state is itself
weak and becoming weaker, then there is less and less effective power and control
to devolve, such that the entire exercise becomes increasingly empty and meaningless
(rather like a person with little or no wealth going to great lengths to write a will
governing what the heirs will inherit).
In sum, I am arguing that the most profound, and yet very
poorly understood, effects of the international changes we are parties and witnesses to
are not in the technical or economic realms, but in the most basic constructs we normally
use to frame discussions of educational policy and international educational cooperation
in the Americas. In the spirit of humility about predicting the future noted above, I make
no claim to have a clear idea of what this all means or where it will lead us. But I do
assert that any "dialogue" about educational policy and international
cooperation in support of it which does not from the outset systematically attend to these
changes is almost certain to be irrelevant to the conditions in which school children and
adult learners in the 1990s will actually live out their lives.
One thing which these background documents emphasize however,
and this is a point with which I entirely agree, is that when thinking about how to
"strengthen international cooperation to improve educational systems throughout the
region" (Puryear's letter of 5 February 1993 to me), we are not for the most part
thinking about modest changes in such educational systems. The question to be addressed is
what has been learned about how international cooperation may strengthen (or, conversely,
weaken) national efforts at major and fundamental reform of educational systems in
the Americas. To deal with this question one must first examine what has been learned
about how to design and implement large-scale and fundamental educational reforms. Put
simply, if we wish international cooperation to serve educational reform, we first have to
understand educational reform itself. The section which follows reviews the experience
regarding educational reform attempts in both rich and poor nations, noting inter alia
some patterns or characteristics of international cooperation which have been either
supportive or destructive of such reform efforts.
Designing and Implementing Educational Reform
We now have more than thirty years of experience with
attempts to design and implement large-scale, long-term programs of educational reform in
Latin America and other "developing" nations, often with the assistance of
multi-lateral or bi-lateral donor agencies, and considerable experience with educational
reform attempts in rich nations as well. During the past few years several major works
have appeared attempting to summarize various aspects of the knowledge acquired from that
experience. (for example, Bryson 1988; Caillods 1989; Fagerlind and Sjosted 1990; Ginsburg
1991; Klees 1989; Rondinelli, et al. 1990; Ross and Mahlick 1990; Farrell 1989b; Farrell,
in press). However, much of the available knowledge is still in the form of
"lore," the experience-based wisdom of those who have been attempting to produce
educational change. The observations below are based both on such published distillations
and on such "lore," as I am aware.
One general lesson is that educational reform is a far more
difficult and risk-prone venture than had been imagined thirty years ago. There are far
more examples of failure, or of minimal success, than of relatively complete success. We
know far more about what doesn't work, or doesn't usually work, than we do about what does
work. A central lesson learned is that Nicolo Machiavelli was correct when he wrote more
than four centuries ago: "And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more
difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success,
than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things." The innovator
has on one hand staunch enemies among "all those who have done well under the old
conditions" and who see clearly an immediate threat to their privilege, but only
"lukewarm defenders" among the intended beneficiaries of the change, since the
putative benefits are uncertain in a dimly perceived future; and people generally "do
not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them"
(Machiavelli 1952 [1513], 9). Moreover, when educational reform attempts have been
successful, the process has usually taken a long time, frequently far longer than
originally anticipated. There are in the experience of the past decades a few examples
where an unusual combination of favorable conditions and politically skilled innovators
have permitted a great deal of educational change to occur in a relatively brief period,
but these are relatively rare and idiosyncratic. A motto which could well be hung on the
walls above the desks of those attempting educational reform is: "T T T: Things Take
Time." These introductory comments are not meant as a counsel of despair, but as a
note of salutary caution. One can learn a great deal from failure, and combining that with
knowledge gained from less common successes permits a number of observations about reform
strategies and approaches, and modes of international cooperation to assist them, which
are likely to be more effective and successful than others. But there are few certainties
and no guarantees.
Another general lesson is that there is no single blueprint
or strategy for designing and implementing educational reform which will "work"
in all circumstances. There are some general principles or guidelines which are often
applicable, but detailed design and planning must be based upon wisdom derived from a solid
knowledge of local conditions. This observation is particularly salient for a paper
such as this which is to relate to the very different nations and societies which
constitute the "Americas." International cooperation has often been helpful in
identifying and bringing to the foreground such locally based knowledge, and in building
systems of institutions which can serve as on-going sources of creation and dissemination
of such locally based knowledge. One thinks, for example, of the very useful support
provided by many agencies for research and policy analysis institutions and units in
education and related social sciences, and for networks of such agencies such as REDUC.
However, such support has been a very small proportion of all international educational
cooperation, and has typically responded more to the "regional" or
"world-wide" priorities of donor agencies, such that kinds of knowledge seen
locally as very relevant are often not developed. Moreover, large and powerful donor
agencies still often routinely produce "regional" policy papers and directives
which, while sometimes paying lip-service to intra-regional variation and the need for
local knowledge, serve as multinational "cookbooks." A "one size fits
all" approach to educational reform is nearly a guarantee of failure. This paper does
not attempt to provide a single "recipe." Rather it provides a kind of taxonomy
of elements and factors to take into account when thinking about educational reform and
the role of international cooperation.
The discussion which follows is organized under six stages of
the "policy cycle" as portrayed in figure 1. This is an old, oversimplified, but
still useful device for organizing a potentially confusing array of issues. Each stage
will be briefly identified, and then considered in greater detail. These stages pertain to
policy development and implementation in all areas of government concern, but the
discussion here will of course focus specifically on education.
Problem Formation: accurately assessing the current
condition of the educational system, and its likely future state if current policies and
practices continue, and reaching agreement among key policy actors and stakeholder groups
as to which of these "conditions" represent "problems" which can and
should be addressed by new policy or policy changes.: accurately assessing the current
condition of the educational system, and its likely future state if current policies and
practices continue, and reaching agreement among key policy actors and stakeholder groups
as to which of these "conditions" represent "problems" which can and
should be addressed by new policy or policy changes.
Policy Agenda: getting the identified policy problems
high enough up on the government's policy agenda that, within some reasonable time frame,
they will actually be addressed by government.: getting the identified policy problems
high enough up on the government's policy agenda that, within some reasonable time frame,
they will actually be addressed by government.
Policy Formulation: determining which of an array of
potential "solutions" to the policy problems are most likely to be feasible and
effective.: determining which of an array of
potential "solutions" to the policy problems are most likely to be feasible and
effective.
Policy Adoption: getting the proposed solutions formally
"enacted" through whatever decision-making mechanisms are necessary and
appropriate.: getting the proposed solutions formally
"enacted" through whatever decision-making mechanisms are necessary and
appropriate.
Policy Implementation: getting the enacted policy
solutions actually operating effectively and more or less as intended in the myriad
educational institutions of the nation.: getting the enacted policy
solutions actually operating effectively and more or less as intended in the myriad
educational institutions of the nation.
Policy Evaluation: determining the impact of the
implemented policies upon the performance of the educational system, identifying the
sources of failure where it has occurred, and on the basis of that determination making
such alterations as may be required.: determining the impact of the
implemented policies upon the performance of the educational system, identifying the
sources of failure where it has occurred, and on the basis of that determination making
such alterations as may be required.
In developing a long-term strategy for educational reform
every one of these stages must be considered, and none can be taken for granted. Reform
ideas and programs can go wrong, and have gone wrong, at each stage. Successfully passing
through any one stage indicates nothing automatically about the probability of passing
successfully through the next. Different sets of knowledge, skills, and strategies are
normally required at each successive stage, usually requiring at least slightly different
sets of people to be involved. Throughout, the process and the problems are much more
"political" than "technical," having much more to do with conflicting
human perceptions, ideologies, self- and group-interests, and emotions and values than
with "hard" research data. This is true at each stage, including those which are
often seen to be predominantly subject to technical analysis. One of the most common
errors in planning educational reforms is to define the exercise in terms of, and
concentrate exclusively upon, the technical aspects of policy formulation, implementation
and (sometimes) evaluation. This has been particularly common in reform programs assisted
by international donor agencies. Indeed, one of the most common sources of tension in
international educational cooperation programs is disputes between donor agency officials
who take a highly "technical" view and recipient nation officials who have a
more "political" understanding. (See Samoff 1993, for a good account of this
tension with reference to Africa. His analysis matches my own experience in Latin
America.) Failure to take into account the political aspects of the three stages noted
immediately above, or ignoring the stages of problem formation, policy agenda and policy
adoption, are an almost sure recipe for failure. Unfortunately the most widely available
"data" refer precisely to the technical side of formulation, implementation and
evaluation. Much less has been published regarding the political aspects of reform
planning, although the relatively few studies which are available indicate clearly their
central importance (see Farrell 1986; Farrell 1990; Farrell, in press; Klees 1989; McGinn,
Schiefelbein and Warwick 1979; McGinn and Street 1986; Schiefelbein 1975; Weiler 1988).
Here one must rely heavily on the "lore" referred to above.
As with any model, this one is a necessary oversimplification
of a much more complex reality. What are depicted here as separate stages often blend
together, overlap chronologically or run in parallel. Using the stages as reference points
is simply meant to ensure that none of the necessary sequences of activities in the long
process which moves one from a sense that a problem exists to a solution implemented well
and widely is overlooked. It will also be noted that the treatments below of the various
stages differ in length. This does not indicate that some are more important than others,
but rather that more information and experience are available about some than others.
Problem Formation
This initial stage is sometimes referred to as the process of
converting "tolerable ironies" into policy problems. In any national educational
system, however rich or poor the nation, there will always be a variety of
"conditions" which are understood by at least some individuals or groups to be
"problems" which should be addressed by policy. In many poor nations a very
serious difficulty at this stage is the lack of reasonably accurate basic data regarding
the status and performance of the system. In such cases a first task is establishing
systems for collecting and analyzing such data. As noted above, in many Latin American
nations international cooperation has been very helpful in creating the infrastructure for
collecting and analyzing such basic data, although in many nations much remains to be done
(Puryear 1993).
A common error, however, and this is particularly common
among international agency officials, is assuming that once such an information system has
been established (whether a simple data assembly unit in a Ministry of Education or a
complex research establishment) problem identification becomes a more or less automatic
technical matter. This is far from the case, as different individuals and groups can be
expected to interpret the same "evidence" differently with respect to whether or
not it represents an educational "policy problem," and if so, what sort of
problem it represents. For example, a relatively high rate of unemployment among school
leavers may be interpreted by some as an educational problem, by others as a problem of
the economy about which education policy can do very little, and by others as a transient
situation which will soon take care of itself. A given percentage of dropouts and/or
repeaters within the schooling system may be considered by some as a serious problem
within the educational system, by others as a normal and inevitable phenomenon (a routine
consequence of differences in academic ability and necessary for the efficient streaming
of youth into occupational categories for which they are most suited), and by still others
as a product of an inequitable class system in the society about which schools can do
little or nothing. Claims by employers and university professors that
"standards" are declining may be roundly denied by teachers and students.
"Hard" evidence from national or international testing programs that average
scores are declining will be interpreted by some as a clear indication that the quality of
the school system is deteriorating, but by others as evidence that the system is
succeeding in holding more lower ability and/or lower class students in school longer.
These differing interpretations of the "evidence"
reflect differing ideological assumptions, differing assumptions about what is
"normal," and usually differing patterns of self- and group-interest. That is,
they are not typically or simply "technical" disputes, but are deeply and
intensely political, and must be dealt with as such. Moreover, even if one can achieve a
reasonably broad agreement that a given set of "conditions" represent a set of
policy problems, there may be considerable disagreement about the relative priority among
them. It is also common for there to be serious disagreements at this stage between
individuals within a country and representatives of international donor agencies, who come
in with their own perceptions and their agencies' priorities. Resolving disagreements at
this first stage is frequently one of the most difficult and sensitive tasks in the reform
process, and one of the most time-consuming. It is also a stage where disagreements are
frequently assumed away, by educators or researchers within the country who believe that
they, with their expertise, "know" what the problems and priorities are, or by
foreign agency officials who come with their own agencies' priorities and cannot imagine
serious and legitimate disagreement, or by "expert consultants" who often bring
their own preconceptions with them (e.g., if you bring in a computer or distance education
expert, you are likely to be told that you have a serious computer or distance education
problem--this is the adult equivalent of the "Law of the Hammer": give a
four-year-old a hammer and suddenly everything will need hammering). If such inevitable
disagreements regarding which "conditions" constitute "policy
problems," and which problems are most important, are not resolved at the outset, at
least to the point where most key actors and stakeholder groups agree, the probability of
carrying the change process through to conclusion is low.
Policy Agenda
Even under the best of circumstances governments face far
more demands upon their resources (money, energy, time) than can possibly be accommodated.
Budgets are tight, senior and middle level officials face overcrowded schedules,
legislative agendas and cabinet meeting agendas are full to overflowing (in one government
with which I have worked--a reasonably typical case in my experience--the general
understanding among senior government officials is that except in a crisis one can get
discussion of any particular policy issue on cabinet agenda no more than once a year, if
lucky). Almost all, if not all, other ministries are competing for government attention to
policy problems they regard as being as important as, if not more important than,
educational policy problems. Even if there has been some formal statement from government
about being committed to "do something" about educational policy problems, it
cannot be assumed that this will translate into high interest at a particular point in
time in the particular set of prioritized issues arising from the policy formation
stage within the education sector. The strategies most appropriate to move a set of
educational problems sufficiently high on a government's overall policy agenda to insure
that effort will be exerted to "do something" about them will vary enormously
from nation to nation, and over time within a given nation, depending upon, among other
things, the relative political strength of various key political actors at any point in
time. With regard to these judgments local knowledge must be decisive. International
cooperation can have little if any constructive force at this stage, except by slowly
altering the general international "climate of opinion" to which large numbers
of key political actors in any given nation respond. (See Grindle 1989, for a useful
discussion of the importance of the perceptual frames and assumptions of "policy
elites.") Unesco's Major Project in the Field of Education in the Latin American
and Caribbean Region, and the dialogue before, during and after the World
Conference on Education for All are good examples of this indirect effect of
international cooperation on political agenda-setting. But direct attempts by
officials of international agencies to alter the policy agenda in a particular nation in
the (false) name of international cooperation are almost always bound to be
counterproductive, unless they happen to coincide with the efforts of strategically
placed, locally knowledgeable and highly skilled local political actors. Unfortunately, a
current trend in many international cooperation agencies in the Americas is precisely to
try to influence the policy agenda of other nations directly; for example, by making
balance of payment or structural adjustment supports contingent upon particular policy (in
our case, educational policy) directions. This trend is more powerful in other
"developing" regions than in the Americas (it is for example blatant in Africa
under the rubric of "Structural Adjustment Policies"), but it is still worrisome
in our region. Fiscal blackmail is not a sound ground upon which to base educational
reform. Officials from international cooperation agencies based in rich nations should
learn from their own national experiences. There are myriad examples in
"developed" nations of educational reform initiatives from educational
"experts" languishing because of inability to get through the policy agenda
stage. If influencing educational, and national, policy agendas is very difficult to do
from inside, it is even more difficult to do from outside. Working toward building up an
international climate of opinion regarding priorities in educational policy is in the long
term (and all educational change of importance is long term) the only effective strategy
for international cooperation.
Policy Formulation
Work on this stage, judging which "solutions" to
identified policy problems are most likely to be effective (and cost-effective), often
overlaps chronologically with the previous stage. Indeed, the knowledge that there is a
potentially feasible and effective solution to a policy problem can raise that problem to
a prominent place on a government's policy agenda. (On this "legitimation
theory" view see Weiler 1983 and Fuller 1991). It is with reference to this question,
what "works," that most of the "hard" evidence is found. Much of that
evidence has been analyzed and summarized in a series of "state of the art"
papers, usually financed by or directly produced by large donor agencies, particularly the
World Bank. (See, e.g., Heyneman, Farrell, and Sepulveda 1978; Fuller 1986; Lockheed and
Verspoor 1990; Farrell and Heyneman 1991; Farrell and Oliveira 1993; plus many Latin
American regional summaries produced by institutions associated with the LARRAG and REDUC
networks.) The major conclusions coming from that literature are generally well known and
will not be reviewed here. Rather, some cautionary notes will be provided. First, there
have been strong methodological critiques advanced regarding many of the underlying
research studies, claiming for example that the regression techniques used in many of the
investigations produce highly unstable and misleading results (Klees 1989), or that the
statistical model used in most education-labor market studies produces results which are
inherently uninterpretable (Farrell and Schiefelbein 1985). These problems can be taken
into account when carefully reading the individual studies, but are very difficult
to deal with when many such studies are summarized.
It should also be noted that while the amount of evidence
regarding particular schooling factors that affect educational or labor market achievement
in Latin America has been increasing rapidly in recent years, the total amount available
is far less than in the United States and Canada. On questions where there may be hundreds
of studies in North America, there may be none, or only a few, from all of Latin America.
It is also clear now that educational research results from North America cannot be
automatically transferred to Latin America. The available evidence is also spotty. Some
questions have received much attention, others little. Some sub-regions or individual
nations have produced much more educational research than others. Much of the research
that has been done is still not readily accessible, although the REDUC network has made
strong gains in this area. Moreover, the investigations themselves are of several
different types. Some are large-scale correlational exercises, others are small-scale
experimental studies, still others are evaluations of a particular program or policy in a
particular nation. This makes it difficult to adequately summarize the results. And
qualitative research, which often provides strong insights into "what works,"
why and how, is rarely included in summaries (for an exception see Fuller 1991).
Finally, just as we cannot assume that research results from
North America will necessarily translate to Latin America, we also cannot assume that
research results from any particular cultural group within Latin America are generalizable
to other cultural groups. This is particularly important when considering educational
policy for indigenous peoples. The anthropological evidence (see Hall 1985) is now clear
that children from different cultures "learn to learn" differently. What will
"work" educationally for children or adults from one culture may be quite
ineffective or counter-productive in others. What all of this suggests is that any
conclusions drawn from the available evidence must be cautious and tentative, and as
location-specific as possible. I have suggested elsewhere that the best way to approach
the general research evidence when considering educational policy in any particular nation
is to consider it as simply providing some hints or suggestions regarding what directions
may be "best bets," "worst bets," and "promising
possibilities" (Farrell 1989b).
Unfortunately, there is a tendency, which appears to be
increasing, for officials of donor agencies, in a "search for certitude," to
take the results of regional or international "state of the art" papers as
"gospel," and attempt to apply them willy-nilly to all nations in a region,
particularly where there is not a strong local research base. This is particularly true of
the World Bank (Samoff 1993), although there certainly are exceptions (its support of Escuela
Nueva in Colombia and MECE in Chile appears to have responded to local research
results). The way in which USAID has been responding to the results of large-scale
research/summary exercises it has sponsored, such as BRIDGES, appears to have much the
same character, in spite of appropriate cautions from the researchers involved. My own
observation of "policy dialogue" within Canadian CIDA finds much the same search
for certainty, and over-generalization. This is an extremely worrisome tendency, and is to
be avoided and resisted if locally sensible "policy solutions" are to be
formulated.
There is another problem with the "what works"
research, and the way in which it is often used in policy discussions/negotiations between
donor agencies and recipient nations. It generally assumes the existence of, and works
within (to strengthen some elements of), the "standard technology of schooling."
That standard technology, or standard delivery system, normally has the following elements
(and comparative research has shown a steady worldwide convergence toward this model over
the past decades):
1. One hundred to several hundred children/youth assembled
(sometimes compulsorily) in a building called a school;
2. For three to six hour per day, where;
3. They are divided into groups of 20 to 60;
4. To work with a single adult (a "certified"
teacher) in a single room;
5. For (especially at the upper levels) discrete periods of
40 to 60 minutes, each devoted to a separate "subject," with;
6. Supporting learning materials, e.g., books, chalkboards,
notebooks, workbooks and worksheets (and in technical areas laboratories, workbenches,
practice sites, etc.), all of which is organized by;
7. A standard curriculum, set by an authority level much
above the individual school, normally the central or provincial/state government, which
all are expected to "cover."
8. Adults "teach" and students "receive
instruction" from them.
9. Teachers (and/or a central exam system)
"evaluate" student learning and provide recognized formal certificates for
"passing" particular "grades" or "levels."
10. Most or all of the financial support comes from national
or regional governments, or other kinds of authority (e.g., in church-related schools)
well above the local community.
There are a variety of explanations (or "theories")
regarding why and how this particular way of delivering opportunities to learn on a large
scale has become well-nigh universal (see Fuller 1991 for a useful summary). However, a
careful examination of the cross-national literature from anthropology (Hall 1985) and
learning psychology (see Case 1985 re: children, and Kidd 1973 and Knowles 1983 re:
adults) regarding how young people and adults best learn suggests that this "standard
technology" is inherently ineffective and inefficient. People of whatever age simply
do not learn best under these arrangements. I have argued elsewhere that one of the
problems with using the "what works," or "school effectiveness,"
literature to devise educational policy is that we are, particularly in richer nations,
reaching the limits of the already limited effectiveness and efficiency of that standard
model (Farrell 1989b). However, on a more hopeful note, throughout Latin America (and
North America and the rest of the world) one finds small and large attempts to
fundamentally alter this traditional model, using combinations of fully trained teachers,
partially trained teachers, para-teachers, community resource people, radio,
correspondence lessons, peer tutoring, student constructed learning materials, students
flowing freely between the "school" and the community, often with local
financing, or with alterations in the cycle of the school "day" or the school
"year." Such change programs do not simply alter one feature of the standard
school (e.g., change one part of the curriculum) or strengthen one or several parts of the
standard model (e.g., add more textbooks or improve teacher training), or add one or two
new features. Rather, they represent a thorough reorganization of the standard technology
of schooling such that the learning program, although often occurring in or based in a
building called a "school," is quite different from what one normally expects to
be happening in a school. They tend to break down the boundaries between
"formal" and "nonformal" education, and tend to focus less on
"teaching" and more on "learning." Where they have been evaluated the
results generally have been very positive. New groups of learners are successfully
reached, and learning results are at least as good as, if not better than, those obtained
in standard schools, and the costs are typically no more than, if not less than, those of
the standard model. Thus, from a cost-effectiveness point of view they are generally very
successful. Moreover, because they typically serve the most marginalized, hardest to reach
and hardest to teach (in the standard mode) students, the learning results from a
"value added" perspective are quite spectacular (Schiefelbein 1991;
Psacharopolous, Rojas and Velez 1993).
Two outstanding examples of such "model breaking"
educational reform programs in Latin America are the Escuela Nueva program in
Colombia (Schiefelbein 1991) and various vocational training (or education for production)
training programs for disadvantaged youth who have been very poorly served by the standard
schooling system (Corvalan-Vasquez 1988). International cooperation, through a variety of
donor agencies, has been key to the development of both of these alternative programs from
initial ideas and small-scale experimentation to large scale successful implementation.
Although these are success stories, international support for such model-breaking programs
is, unfortunately, rather rare. As noted above, one can find throughout Latin America many
such potentially promising educational change programs, often developed by local teachers
or risk-taking action/researchers in response to the desperate situations they routinely
encounter; but most are unknown by Ministry of Education officials (standard procedures
and reporting channels tend to shut such information out), let alone by international
agency officials who work only with government officials, although knowledge about them is
often common currency among NGOs and local teachers and base level administrators. A very
useful role for international cooperation would be to assist in identifying such
potentially useful fundamental alterations in the standard model of schooling, funding
detailed small-scale studies of how they got started, and how they work and achieve their
results, and supporting carefully evaluated experiments in diffusing them to other
locations. Such work can be highly productive in the long term, as the two examples noted
above illustrate, but it is not typically attempted by donor agencies, principally, it
seems to me, because the support required is too small scale, risky, and long term to fit
well within the normal administrative practices of such agencies. Nonetheless, a
potentially very creative role of international cooperation would be to fund a set of
locally based and locally administered micro-regional programs for identification and
experimentation with such locally and independently developed fundamental innovations. If
such support were linked with support for regional research and information dissemination
networks such as REDUC, the potential for maximizing the influence of such knowledge as is
already locally available would be high. It appears to be very difficult for international
cooperation agencies to play this kind of role, but the two examples noted above indicate
that it is not impossible. Detailed examination of how these successes occurred would be
very helpful.
Policy Adoption
Getting a set of policy problems high on a government agenda,
and keeping them there (often a very difficult matter), and arriving at a set of
reform propositions which are analytically sound and generally supported by stakeholder
groups, is no guarantee that government will actually do anything about them. The
previous stages require a combination of analytical and political skill. At this stage the
job is almost wholly political, and can be accomplished only by individuals who are highly
skilled, locally based and locally knowledgeable political operatives (whatever their
formal job descriptions might be). It is at this stage that the competitive and
conflicting interests of other ministries and agencies of government come most strongly
into play, and convincing the Finance Minister (or his/her officials) becomes crucial
(unless one is in the rare and happy position of advocating a reform proposition which
will not increase the total budgetary allocation to education). Very carefully done cost
analysis is often necessary to convince finance ministry officials, and it is frequently
useful to be able to demonstrate that a significant portion of the costs of the reform
program will be supported by reallocations within the existing Ministry of Education
budget. The very "fuzzy" nature of the boundaries between education and other
social policy sectors can often be used to turn potential opponents from other ministries
or agencies into allies, by incorporating some of their goals and interests into the
educational reform proposal (this is often done at the policy formulation stage). One must
beware, however, of creating "smorgasbord" or "Christmas tree"
programs, which consist of large numbers of only vaguely related elements. Such projects
often result from a confluence of local political need to satisfy a variety of competing
interests, and the desire of donor agencies to put together an administratively convenient
(i.e., large enough) investment package. Such reform projects are generally
cost-inefficient and very difficult to implement and administer effectively, and should be
avoided.
Enactment of an educational reform package typically requires
an array of decisions (legislation, directives, decrees, regulations), many of which are
obvious but others less so. For example, reform programs have sometimes been blocked or
seriously slowed because necessary changes in, or exceptions to, import taxes or
restrictions could not be obtained and essential material could not be acquired, or
because necessary personnel changes were blocked by existing civil service rules which
were not changed. Thus, to successfully enact the reform, someone, or some group, has to
know clearly which parts of the overall reform proposal have to be approved and enacted by
which agencies or institutions of government, and through which processes, and keep track
of who is responsible for which parts of the overall process, keeping everything running
more or less in parallel. It is not uncommon to find a reform scheme stymied because while
almost all of its necessary elements have been "approved" one key element is
irretrievably stuck in some bureaucratic or political swamp. (In my experience this is as
common in rich nations as in poor ones.) If there are active opponents to the reform
proposal one must assume that they will be looking for precisely such "sticking
points" as strategic areas to exert blockage power. Outside consultants or
international agency officials can often play a useful role here in asking the right
questions (of the "What has to be done here?" or "Are there any regulations
which need changing there?" sort), but they can never presume to have the right
answers.
As in all political decision making, judgments regarding
proper "timing" are crucial; in all political systems there are good times and
bad times for attempting to enact policy changes, and these follow a pattern which has
little or nothing to do with the internal cycles and needs of the educational system.
These political cycles also have nothing particularly to do with the decision and funding
cycles of donor agencies. Waiting until the "time is right" politically to
maximize the chances of a reform proposal passing through the adoption phase is frequently
very difficult for technically oriented planners/policy developers and international
agency officials responding to their own bureaucratic constraints, but it is essential. In
contrast, it sometimes happens that the politically propitious moment for enactment occurs
before all of the technical work has been completed. In such cases it is usually far
better to take advantage of the political opportunity, as it is generally easier and
quicker to fill in technical gaps later than it is to wait for or try to recreate the
political moment. Indeed, being ready to move when political windows of opportunity open
up (usually briefly) is a key element of reform design and delivery. Another key aspect of
the "timing" question is deciding whether to attempt to enact the entire reform
package all at once, or to proceed by stages. There is no universal prescription. Both
options have sometimes succeeded and sometimes failed.
To repeat, dealing effectively with all of the issues noted
in this section depends upon locally based, knowledgeable and sensitive political
judgment. This cannot be emphasized too much. Political misjudgment during the policy
adoption phase is an extremely frequent cause of educational reform failure, in both rich
and poor nations. In developing nations such misjudgments are often, unfortunately, the
result of pressure from outside consultants or international agency officials who are
insufficiently knowledgeable about and sensitive to the needs and constraints of local
political decision makers, and the way in which politics "works" in a particular
nation, and who are responding primarily to the decision cycles of their own agencies and
their own career-advancement imperative to "move the money." It should be noted
finally that while reliance on such local knowledge and judgment is essential, it is no
guarantee that a reform proposal will successfully work its way through the policy
adoption phase. Political judgment is inherently risky and failure-prone, as any number of
involuntarily retired politicians can tell us. But not relying on such local knowledge is
a near guarantee of failure.
Implementation
Managing the implementation of change in educational
organizations is more complex than in most other public or private enterprises. In
education one is attempting to deliver (or change the delivery of) an intangible
end-product (learning) on a non-sale basis to a diverse, diffuse, and often reluctant
clientele, using delivery agents (teachers) over whose routine daily behavior one has
minimum or no effective control, and in conditions where efforts to exert such control are
frequently counter productive to the general goals of the system. Beyond this, in
educational change one is dealing with what is most important to most people in a society:
the destiny of their children and the future of the society in which their, and everyone
else's, children will live their adult lives. Almost every group in a society are
potential stakeholders in the process, passions are easily and quickly aroused, and the
deepest value conflicts in a society are played out in debates over, and reactions to,
attempts at educational reform (Farrell 1990). These passions are found throughout the
policy cycle, but they come very quickly to the fore during the implementation stage. For
here, abstract notions and vague possibilities begin to assume a reality in the lives of
youngsters. It is at this stage that potential stakeholders tend to become real
stakeholders. If their interests have not been taken into account fully throughout the
process, they will make them fully visible here. The management of educational reform
implementation is quintessentially political. It is not fundamentally a technical
exercise is which PERT charts, logical framework analyses, organizational analyses, or
other tools of the professional "change agent" trade, which are very much in
vogue in donor agencies, have much use (except as ways to keep files straight and an
office efficiently running). The single most common cause of implementation failure is
focusing on the technical and forgetting the political; of forgetting that implementation
means changing the routine behavior of very large numbers of people at all levels of the
system (including students and their parents) who cannot effectively be
"commanded." It is a matter of treating people honestly rather than
manipulatively, of persuasion, demonstration, tolerance for variation, and getting the
positive incentives right.
It is extremely important to build in a capacity to learn during
implementation. Things will always turn out differently than expected in at least some
important areas. Educational systems are systems. Changing anything will change
other things in ways which are almost impossible to fully anticipate. Ongoing learning
capacity also allows detection of blockage points early enough to do something effective
about them. Ongoing "evaluation" (see below) provides the "data" for
such learning capacity, but equally important is keeping administrative systems flexible
enough and regulations general enough that changes can easily be made as required in
response to such data. Rigid bureaucratic rules and complex and time-consuming processes
for approval of changes in a program design imposed by international donor agencies are a
major inhibitor to the development of this ongoing learning capacity.
Top-down, centrally driven, and command-oriented forms of
implementation almost never work well; and where they can be made to work well they
tend to create resentments and resistances which make future changes even more difficult
and impair the ongoing learning capacity discussed above. Several of the most commonly
cited implementation "models" in the literature (e.g., Fullan 1982; Miles 1987)
can best be described as "disguised" or "manipulative" top-down
models. They are in essence approaches for manipulating teachers and lower level
administrators so that they will behave in accordance with the ideas or decrees of senior
officials or "experts." Teachers are considered as "objects" whose
behavior is to be modified, not as sources of knowledge, insight, information and ideas.
Parents and students hardly figure at all in such models. By manipulating or ignoring
precisely those groups whose enthusiastic collaboration is essential to the solid
implementation of significant educational reform, such models are recipes for serious
problems in the mid- to long-term. Teachers must have the opportunity to learn: about the
proposed reform and about how to operate it successfully in their own classrooms. (This
assumes that their views have been given significant weight during the policy formulation
process. If not, there is little that can be done at this stage to correct for the error;
the reform effort will be doomed to serious implementation problems.) This teacher
learning is best conceived and arranged not as a "teaching" process (experts
from the ministry or the university going out to tell the teachers) but as the provision
of opportunities to learn, through teacher centers, demonstration classes and centers,
chances to experiment safely, mentoring arrangements, and such. This kind of innovation
diffusion approach to implementation often appears to work more slowly than a
major-push, centrally-driven "blitz." But in the medium to long term it tends to
work far better and deeper. Unfortunately, the "limited term project" mentality
common in donor agencies works directly against such a long-term diffusion approach to
implementation.
Evaluation
There is vast and generally well-known
technical/methodological literature on "evaluation" which there is no need to
recapitulate here. Rather, a few points which are sometimes overlooked in the literature
and practice will be briefly noted.
Much of the data required for routine ongoing evaluation of a
reform program are available from information collected by the Ministry of Education (and
other agencies of government) for routine administration purposes (e.g., enrollment
patterns, test scores, assigned grades, financial flows, and the like). However, such data
are often incomplete and/or wildly inaccurate, and are often hidden or purposely distorted
for bureaucratic or political reasons. Finding out where the good data are before mounting
a major reform effort is often an expensive but essential up-front investment. Moreover,
even the good data can easily get lost in bureaucratic files if special systems are not
established to ensure that they arrive in a timely fashion on the desks of those
responsible for monitoring the reform project. One cannot simply assume that because such
data exist somewhere in the ministry (or other elements of government) they will
automatically be provided to those who need them for project evaluation purposes. Since
the possession and control of information is a major source of power, it is safer to
assume the contrary, and therefore to establish special procedures for rechanneling such
data. Funding research/policy analysis institutions outside government, or at least
outside normal bureaucratic channels, which can provide a relatively independent view of
such data could be a very useful role for international cooperation. Many of the
institutions associated with the REDUC network, supported by a variety of donor agencies,
have played a very useful role in this regard.
Non-routine evaluation exercises involve the creation
of information not normally produced from the ordinary functioning of the educational
system. They are often essential, but they are also expensive. Because of the cost it is
important that such exercises be carefully and judiciously designed, taking into account
information that is already available somewhere in the system, and the use to which each
piece of newly created information will be put. Two of the most common and costly errors
in reform evaluation design (and I have seen these repeatedly in international cooperation
projects, usually because international agency officials were following some sort of
agency "cookbook") are (1) collecting information which is already available
somewhere in the system and (2) collecting information which is never used.
A mix of evaluation techniques and approaches is required for
most reform projects, since they combine a variety of objectives and processes. Both
quantitative and qualitative "evaluation research" approaches are usually
needed. Often, the most generally useful sources of information are classroom
observations, and the opinions and experiences of students, teachers, and parents. Much of
this information is anecdotal; setting up systems for recording and archiving such
anecdotal evidence is usually well worth the investment. Although the pattern is slowly
changing, it is still the case that large international donor agencies rely upon and take
seriously only "hard" quantitative evaluation data. (Samoff 1993, provides a
very good analysis of the organizational dynamics behind this quantitative data focus
regarding the World Bank's work in Africa, which is generalizable to many other agencies
and the Americas.)
Evaluation exercises, especially "end of project"
evaluations, designed and/or commissioned by funding agencies are often quite useless from
the point of view of the recipient country, as they focus heavily on the administrative
requirements of the donor (e.g., was the money disbursed on schedule, did planned
activities take place on time, has material been acquired and disbursed on schedule, etc.)
rather than on actual ground-level changes and the results of the reform.
Roles of Donor Agencies
From the above it should be evident that serious educational
reform, of the sort that seems to be needed throughout the Americas (and not just
in Latin America), is a slow, complex, chancy and highly political business. A central
argument here is that many of the standard operating procedures of international donor
agencies, who are the major financiers of international educational cooperation within the
Americas, and thus the central actors in the process, run directly counter to, and
interfere with, the way in which effective major educational change takes place, in the
relatively rare occasions in which it does take place. Many of these patterns of behavior
have been noted briefly in the pages above. Some of the more important are listed below,
in summary fashion.
There is a tendency among donor agencies to overgeneralize
from the results of often problematic research and attempt to apply "standard
solutions" to all nations in a region. This is combined with a pattern of
"faddishness" as different sets of standard solutions go in and out of fashion.
For example, support for secondary level technical or "diversified" education
was once very much "in"; now it is less so. Support for primary education was
long a low priority; lately it has become fashionable.
There is within donor agencies a predominant "search for
certitude" and a desire for "quick fixes" which ignore just how risky and
slow effective educational change usually is.
There is an overwhelming tendency to regard educational
change as a "technical" matter and to consider "politics" as at best a
bothersome nuisance. The prevailing view is captured in the following quote: "The
politicization of decision-making in Latin America has traditionally undermined the role
of technical analysis" (Reimers 1991, 348). To imagine that politically sensitive
educational decisions (and they are almost all such) could be taken without
"politicization" is destructively unrealistic. If "political factors"
are taken into account at all they are typically viewed as something to be gotten around
or gotten through rather than as an inherent and essential part of the change process.
Funding patterns are normally short term compared to the
length of time required for educational change, and based on one or a collection of
specific projects with rigid (as well as too short) time lines. Educational systems do
not change that way. When reasonably long-term funding has been arranged, usually
through a succession of short-term projects, and some success has been achieved, this is
frequently a signal to the donor to cut off the funding and redirect the resources to some
area of more "desperate" need. This cuts off the possibility of the really
important benefits which only come in the more long term, and effectively penalizes the
recipients for having been successful.
The administrative imperative to work with large investment
packages (keeping the donor's administrative costs down) produces "smorgasbord"
or "Christmas tree" programs consisting of collections of discrete projects
which are fundamentally unrelated (except perhaps in the prose of a proposal writer with
high creative writing skills).
Constant personnel changes in donor agencies produce serious
continuity and institutional memory problems in necessarily long-term programs. This
happens regularly even with relatively short-term projects. I was recently involved in a
three-year project of quite small scale which experienced four changes of donor agency
program officers. Much of our time was spent (wasted) in bringing each successive agency
official "up to speed." This is not, I am sure, what the taxpayers of Canada
imagined they were financing when their members of parliament supported the overseas
assistance appropriation. Recipient country project managers have to spend an inordinate
amount of their time educating successive waves of equally uninformed donor agency
officials. (As one such official said to me in exasperation a few years ago: "The
least they could do is talk to each other while they play musical chairs!") This
pattern may be great for the personal growth and career advancement of donor agency
officials, but it doesn't do much for educational reform.
Donor agencies funding or looking for projects in education
in a particular nation rarely work effectively together, and seldom have a clear idea of
what everyone else is doing. Their competitive, jealous, non-cooperative collective
presence in a particular nation makes educational reform even harder than it normally is.
Indeed, one frequently sees the bizarre situation in which the donors are even more
uncooperative among themselves (and more assiduously protective of their own national
interests) than are the recipients who are accused by the donors of being overly
protective of their national interests. One might call the situation Kafkaesque, but that
would be unfair to Kafka. He never described a situation quite so strange.
In one sense the obvious "lesson" is that donor
agencies should alter the behaviors noted above. I must admit, however, that I have no
clear idea as to how that might actually come about. Some would argue that these patterns
of behavior are the inevitable consequence of well-nigh universal organizational
imperatives of large bureaucracies, and therefore nearly impossible to change so long as
international cooperation is financed and administered by large bureaucratic
organizations. Others would argue that they are the ineluctable consequence of highly
unequal power relationships between donor and recipient nations, and will not change until
those power relationships change. I am convinced of one thing, however. If these patterns
of behavior and attitude are not changed the probability is very low that international
cooperation can in general promote and support educational reform in the Americas; indeed,
if such patterns are not changed the probability is highest that international cooperation
will be a hindrance to educational reform. It will most likely be time, energy and
money not only wasted, but used counterproductively. There are, however, some
"successes;" cases in which significant educational reform has been
accomplished, and in which international cooperation has played an important role. Cases
which come to mind and with which I am personally familiar include the educational reform
in Chile during the Frei regime, the development of the REDUC network, the development of
education for production programs for disadvantaged youth, the Escuela Nueva
program in Colombia, and (as far as one can tell at the moment), the MECE project in
Chile. My own impression, based on personal experience, and the "lore" referred
to above, is that these successes have occurred because the local change agents were smart
enough and lucky enough to circumvent or overcome the donor agency patterns discussed
above, and/or were able to manipulate the donor agencies to their own advantage. A very
useful role for the Inter-American Dialogue would be to initiate a careful
investigation of how these "successes" occurred and how international
cooperation was in these cases actually helpful, and to compare these cases to a good
sample of the more typical failures in educational reform and international cooperation in
support of it. A further useful role would be to facilitate discussions with donor
agencies regarding ways to alter the counterproductive behaviors discussed above.
Toward a Different Model of International Cooperation
Underlying the organizational behavior difficulties discussed
above is a deeper problem which has been briefly alluded to. The basic "model"
of international cooperation which has become well-nigh universal is not the
"solution" but the "problem." That model, the "foreign aid"
or "technical assistance" model, is inherently hierarchical; one set of nations
(the "donors") bring their resources and expertise to bear upon the problems of
another set of nations (the "recipients"). It is assumed implicitly (and
sometimes explicitly), that the recipients have the "problems" and the donors
have the "solutions" and the resources required to apply them. It is assumed,
although this is rarely said out loud and often officially denied, that there is a natural
confluence between having more resources (money) and having better ideas or more
"expertise." Even when "ideas" from recipient nations are financed by
donor agencies, those ideas must first be accepted and approved by those with the funds.
Such a model necessarily breeds arrogance on one side and resentment and frustration on
the other; and it has in general proven to be ineffective or counterproductive in
promoting educational reform in the Americas. I argue that even where it has in a general
sense seemed to be successful it has sown the seeds of its own failure. In pursuing
this argument it is useful to separate discussion of fiscal flows and ideational flows.
Fiscal Flows
It is obviously the case that one of the differences between
rich nations and poor nations is that the former have more money than the latter. It is
also obviously the case that at least some of the educational reform problems in poor
nations cannot be dealt with without infusions of money from richer nations. But how
such money gets transferred is all important, and the record within the Americas over the
past few decades has not been encouraging. Reimer's analysis of fiscal flows in support of
international cooperation in education within the Americas over the past decades is most
instructive. He notes that the massive educational expansion in Latin America during the
1970s was "credit led" (Reimers 1990, 45). That is, a significant portion of the
marginal costs required by that expansion were financed by borrowing from
international donors. However, the educational borrowings were part of the overall debt
whose servicing created the "debt crisis" of the 1980s and 90s, whose effect has
been (among many other things) to cripple the educational systems of many Latin American
nations and to, in effect, bring them back to where they were, or worse than they were,
before the expansion of the 1970s. In sum, international debt-financed educational change
helped create the cause of its own destruction (Reimers 1991). This is not to argue for a
cessation of transfers of funds from those who have more money than they need to those who
have less than they need. It is to argue for an alteration of the terms of
such transfers so that they do not create a repetition of that disastrous cycle.
Ideational Flows
The notion that educational "ideas" or
"solutions" originating in the North of the Americas are better or more powerful
than those originating in the South of the Americas is bizarre and arrogant, and indicates
that educational "experts" from the North have little understanding of just how
badly they have managed collectively to diagnose and correct the difficulties in their own
educational systems. The operative phrase here should be: "Physician, heal
thyself!" The educational research and reform industry in the United States and
Canada is massive, offering gainful employment to thousands of professors, researchers,
and change agents. Yet complaints of massive educational problems are common currency in
both of these rich societies, and their educational systems seem to have remained
impervious to the expenditures of huge sums of money on their putative improvement.
Fierce scholarly and political debates rage in both nations
regarding the causes of the educational malaise, and what might be done about it.
Attendance at any annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association or the
Canadian Society for the Study of Education, or organizations of various specialized
groups of practitioners or researchers, will bear witness to this rampant confusion and
disagreement. Yet, leading "experts" from both of these rich American nations
regularly presume to tell educational officials from the poorer nations of our hemisphere
what they ought to do about their educational problems! The educational and
economic/political disadvantages of members of racial and ethnic minorities in both Canada
and the United States continue, in general, to remain impervious to attempts at
educational reform. The economies of both nations are mired in deep recession, and various
attempts at educational change and job training schemes have had nil effect to date. In
both nations income distribution has been steadily worsening since the early 1980s. What
exactly do either of these nations have to teach to the rest of the hemisphere about how
to use educational reform to improve either economic growth or social equity? My answer is
simple: practically nothing at all, except as salutary bad examples. But of course it
would be very hard to even imagine a well-paid, upper-middle class professional
representative of one of the donor agencies (or even a middle-middle class representative
of one of the increasingly noticeable nongovernmental agencies) actually admitting that
they don't really know what to do; that in reality nobody knows what to do. It would be
even harder for them to admit that indeed the primary beneficiaries of the "foreign
aid" model of international cooperation have been the quite well paid professional
administrators of those otherwise often useless, and frequently counterproductive, North
to South fiscal flows.
What has to be done is to recognize collectively that whether
we speak English, Spanish or Portuguese, whether we are members of rich nations or poor
nations, we are all equal in our befuddlement about what sorts of educational changes
might contribute to the solution of the economic, social and political problems all
nations of the Americas face, and about how to enact and implement effectively such
educational reforms. At the same time, all nations of the hemisphere have examples of
modest but potentially promising "successes." And we all are, or at least ought
to be, equally puzzled by the direction and consequences of the evident massive and rapid
changes in the global economic, political, social, environmental (and educational)
conditions. In this context it is somewhat disheartening to note that all of the
background documents referred to in the first paragraph of this paper are redolent with
language which reflects the traditional "foreign aid" understanding of
international cooperation. For example, in these documents the "problems" are
all discussed in relation to Latin America, as though the social, economic, political and
educational problems were not equally difficult and intractable in North America. But, if
we were all collectively to admit to it in due intellectual humility, the collective and
mutual confusion regarding the changing nature of our world, and the place of educational
reform in dealing with it, could provide the basis for developing a quite different model
of international cooperation. I have elsewhere referred to this model as "horizontal
intellectual cooperation" and have described one small effort at enacting it among
one Canadian and two Chilean educational research institutions (Farrell 1989; see also
Shaeffer 1991). This model starts from the assumption that we all have much to
teach each other and much to learn from each other; that all of our knowledge is equally
tentative and equally valid; and that such knowledge derived from any given society or
culture must be carefully tested and validated before being applied in any other society
or culture. This model would place less emphasis on the transfer of funds among agencies
and governments, and more on the collective creation and critical examination of ideas.
Operationally, such a model would imply support for institutions and centers which create
and analyze educational knowledge, and for collaborative interchange among them. Support
for the expansion of networks such as REDUC would be a good place to start. Collective
exploration of how this model of international educational cooperation might be enacted
would be a task worthy of the Inter-American Dialogue. It would likely be a far better use
of such resources as can be found than trying to "fine tune" the traditional
"foreign aid" model of international cooperation.
Some Concluding Observations
The reader of these pages may arrive at this point with the
conclusion that I take a pessimistic (perhaps unduly pessimistic) view of the
possibilities of achieving needed educational changes, and of the possibilities of
inventing modes of international cooperation which might support such change efforts. The
experience, and analysis of it, briefly outlined above, could easily lead one to such a
pessimistic conclusion, but that is not where I will end this essay. I actually take from
this experience what might best be called a "cautiously optimistic" conclusion.
It is clear that it is extremely difficult to successfully accomplish large-scale,
national-level and top-down educational reform programs. But at the same time we have many
examples of very successful change attempts at the level of the local school, or a small
system of schools, and occasionally (as in Colombia's Escuela Nueva program) in
systems of thousands of schools. That is, while it seems very difficult to change a national
school system, it appears relatively easy to change a classroom, or, a
school, in ways which are often unknown by national- or international-level officials.
And thousands of such very local changes can, over time (in an innovation diffusion
process), build from the bottom-up into a major change in the overall "national"
education effort. What we have to do, I would suggest, is to identify these local
successes and learn from them. That task is not to invent and implement "the
innovation" or "the reform" across the whole national territory, but rather
to develop and unleash a capacity to innovate throughout the system. The result
would likely be a highly variegated, locally adapted, set of learning systems which, while
occurring in buildings called "schools," would have few of the characteristics
of the "standard model" of schooling outlined earlier.
It is not yet at all clear how that capacity to innovate
which we see in these localized cases of successful change can be generalized. It does
seem clear that, under the right circumstances, even very poorly paid teachers working
under extremely difficult conditions, can enact major educational changes in their
own classrooms and schools. It does seem clear that national educational system
administrators can, under the right circumstances, become change agents rather than
change blockers. It does seem clear that, under the right circumstances, officials of
international donor agencies can work through or around the constraints of the
bureaucratic systems in which they operate to assist in the creation of truly hopeful
innovations. The periodic successes indicate that the task is possible. But how do we
convert the possible into the probable? How do we create the
"circumstances" which can unleash the human energy and sense of vocation which
draw most people into the "education" and "development" fields in the
first place? I do not claim in this paper to have provided many answers--certainly not any
definitive answers--to that question. A central task of the Inter-American Dialogue would
be to provide a forum in which the answer to that question can be collaboratively
developed by people representing all of the groups which have a stake in the way in which
their society manages the provision of opportunities for its citizens (young and old) to
learn. But one cannot possibly get the "answer" right until one gets the
"question" right. My main aim in this paper has been to contribute to getting
the question right.
* Dr. Farrell is currently Head of the
Comparative, International and Development Education Centre, and Professor in the
Department of Adult Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. He
received his Ph.D. in Comparative Education from Syracuse University. He has authored and
co-authored several books and articles in the field of educational development including Teacher
Development in Developing Nations, Textbooks in Developing Countries: Economic and
Education Choices, and The National Unified Schools in Allende's Chile: The Role of
Education in the Destruction of a Revolution.
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