<<Biblioteca Digital del Portal<<INTERAMER<<Serie Educativa<<Sustainable Development in Latin America: Financing and Policies Working in Synergy<<Application of Economic Instruments for Environment Management in Latin America: from Theoretical to Practical Constraints
Colección: INTERAMER
Número: 69
Año: 2000
Autor: Ramón López and Juan Carlos Jordán, Editors
Título: Sustainable Development in Latin America: Financing and Policies Working in Synergy
Resource Use Charges In Latin America
Table 2 presents a summary of natural resources pricing in Latin America
according to a recent survey presented in Serôada Motta, Huber, and Ruitenbeek
(1999).8 These examples were successfully implemented only when they did
not depend on institutional capacity to collect the revenue through procedures
based on monitoring and user performance. It can also be noticed that the
definition of pricing criteria was equally important to set the basis of
the pricing system and avoid political barriers.
Forestry taxes and royalties on oil and electricity production are typically
oriented to financing purposes, i.e., revenue-raising. On the other hand,
water charges implemented in the region face the dilemma of adopting pricing
criteria to accommodate a variety of objectives that are not always consistent.
In Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, a forestry tax is charged for wood
consumption when the harvesting is not offset by equivalent reforestation.
These taxes are set for financing purposes to foster reforestation, not
to achieve an ecological goal such as curbing deforestation. They are usually
very low and poorly enforced, particularly in frontier regions where monitoring
is difficult.9
However, royalties from natural resource exploitation are already in place
in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela with relative success.
TABLE 2
SOME EXAMPLES OF NATURAL RESOURCE PRICING IN LATIN AMERICA
SOME EXAMPLES OF NATURAL RESOURCE PRICING IN LATIN AMERICA
Country/ Instrument |
Forestry Taxation
|
Charges on Natural Resource Exploitation |
Water Charges for Use and Pollution |
Brazil
|
On forestry activities without adequate reforestation
|
On mineral and hydroelectricity production to compensate municipalities
where exploitation takes place
|
Sewage tariffs based on pollution content in place in some states. Full
water charges based on river basin authority already approved in some states
and under discussion at federal level
|
Colombia
|
On forestry activities without adequate reforestation
|
On mineral and hydroelectricity production to compensate municipalities
where exploitation takes place
|
Charges based on cost recovery partially implemented being replaced by
charges reflecting full environmental costs
|
Ecuador
|
On oil to finance environmental research and management institute
|
||
Mexico
|
Wastewater discharge at national level partially implemented and under
revision
|
||
Venezuela
|
On forestry activities without adequate reforestation
|
Source: Serôada Motta, Huber, and Ruitenbeek (1999).
In Brazil and Colombia, these royalties, created in the 1990s, are a small
proportion (varying from 4% to 6%) of the gross revenue of hydroelectricity,
mineral, and oil production. In reality, they are earmarked revenue sources
for the municipalities where exploitation takes place; some funds are also
earmarked for regulatory and environmental agencies. In Colombia, the use
of royalty funds for preservation purposes is more strictly earmarked than
in Brazil; the Brazilian experience has been one of using the royalty revenue
as a supplementary budgetary source for general revenue purposes. Royalties
in Ecuador and Venezuela are strictly based on oil revenue. In Ecuador
the royalty is a form of tax levy on oil passing through the pipeline from
the Ecuadorian Amazon; it is earmarked for the Ecuadorian Institute for
Eco-Development in the Amazon Region (ECORAE), formed in 1992. Royalty
income in Venezuela, by contrast, finances the general federal budget.
Royalties may become an important source of revenue for environmental agencies
if applied on resources with low price elasticity of demand, as in the
case of minerals and electricity. Revenue aims can be achieved through
a small share of the production value, with low collection costs that do
not depend much on institutional capacity and sophisticated legislation.
Political constraints may arise, however, in countries where the private
sector is increasing its participation and faces strong international competition.